SentraMind

Primer

Evidence is ciphertext at rest

What the two-level evidence envelope is for, what the database is allowed to hold, and what this POC does not prove about hardware custody.

The evidence row in the database is ciphertext

Captured content is not stored in the clear in the evidence database. The row holds ciphertext. The envelope uses a per-event data key, that key is wrapped by an evidence key, and the ciphertext is bound to the event. Opening the row on the wrong event fails the binding, which is the point of tying the ciphertext to one event rather than to a reusable blob.

The sentence names the evidence row. It does not sweep in every file the appliance writes while a decision is still in flight, and it does not record that a hardware token has already performed a reveal. Those limits have their own sections below. Keeping them in separate sentences is how the ciphertext claim stays one a buyer can repeat accurately.

AES-256-GCM is the envelope, chosen for a console reveal

The construction is AES-256-GCM. The practical reason is the reveal: an officer on the console should be able to decrypt with WebCrypto, using crypto the browser already has, rather than a second construction the console would have to carry alone. The algorithm is a design fact about the envelope this POC actually seals.

A design fact has edges. Selecting AES-256-GCM does not mean a hardware-token ceremony has been completed here. It also does not record an outside review that would let anyone describe the implementation as attested by a third party. The name of the algorithm tells you how the row is sealed. It does not tell you who holds the key, which is the next section.

Officer keys in this phase are software

Unwrap depends on officer keys held in the appliance’s development profile. The reveal surface is expected to name that token kind, so a sealed row is not silently read as hardware custody. Hardware officer tokens are absent. PIV and FIDO2 sit inside that absence. They are not an unlabelled option waiting off the side of the screen.

The ceremony can still have a production shape. A completed reveal walks the sequence a later hardware reveal would walk. The keys protecting this one are software. Anyone who can read the development material on the appliance can reach those keys, which is a different situation from a token that leaves with an officer. The sequence being familiar is not the custody being hardware.

The local spool is not the sealed envelope

The verdict service writes a local spool record before the database has accepted the decision, so a database outage does not turn an already enforced verdict into an error response. That spool is a durability aid for the decision. It is a different object from the evidence ciphertext, and this primer does not call it sealed.

Decision metadata on the spool is in the clear: the named actor, the host, the matched rules, the action, the length. Captured content plaintext is refused from that record. The content-bearing member, where content is present, is the sealed output. An undrained spool line is not yet on the audit chain, and this POC does not make the spool file itself tamper-evident. Filesystem permissions are the control on that file until a drain appends the event.

Sealed is reserved for the ciphertext

On the console, the sealed treatment means sealed evidence. The signal is scarce so that operators can trust it when it appears. A roadmap card, a placeholder, and an ordinary notice use a neutral treatment. Spending the sealed colour on unfinished interface would teach people that the signal means “notice,” and the real envelope would inherit that confusion.

Software custody travels with the signal. A view that shows a sealed state in this POC also shows that the officer key is software. The visual claim and the custody label belong together. Dropping the label would let the colour imply a hardware token this build does not have. The row can be genuine ciphertext and still be unwrapped only by a software key, and both halves of that sentence belong on the screen.

How to read this

How to read this
Read it asWhich meansDo not read it as
Evidence at rest Ciphertext, key wrapped, bound to the event Plaintext in the database
AES-256-GCM Chosen so a reveal can use WebCrypto A hardware-token ceremony already performed
Officer unwrap Software keys in this POC Hardware custody

Product statements on this page follow the POC maturity ladder. A coming-next or roadmap item is not available for the current evaluation.