What changes for the organisation
A deterministic policy engine, sealed evidence and a hash-chained record for later capabilities to build on. The logic is real. The identities, endpoints and traffic it runs on in this POC are seeded or synthetic.
Policy, sealed evidence and the tamper-evident record the other capabilities stand on, with local accounts standing in for Active Directory in this POC.

What changes for the organisation
A deterministic policy engine, sealed evidence and a hash-chained record for later capabilities to build on. The logic is real. The identities, endpoints and traffic it runs on in this POC are seeded or synthetic.
How it works
A local account table supplies identity and roles in this POC. One deterministic evaluator resolves subject, detector class, destination, action, override cost and evidence capture. Captured content is sealed under an evidence key whose secret half is split among officers, and each event is hashed over the previous hash and its own stored bytes.
The mechanism, not the marketing. If a step below would not survive an engineer's scrutiny, it should not be on this page.
Operating path
A synthetic run of the real chain and verifier code, on two events built in memory. It shows what the answer to an auditor's question can say, and what it cannot.
A short synthetic chain holds two events and a signed checkpoint, and the verifier passes. Then one stored byte of sequence 1 changes on purpose, at offset 288, so “Synthetic” reads “Rynthetic”. Nothing else moves.
The verifier runs again. It computes 61fd4504… from the stored bytes, finds 22d2868d… stored beside them, and stops: verified false, at sequence 1, kind hash-mismatch.
The auditor compares that with the checkpoint. Its signature still verifies, because it signs a body that names a hash, and that hash has not changed. The auditor goes by the verifier, not the signature.
The break is pinned to one sequence number. The output also reads checkpointsChecked 0, because the verifier stopped before the head the checkpoint names. That zero does not mean a clean checkpoint.
The verifier does not say who changed the byte or when, and it cannot restore it. This run used a throwaway signing key and did not touch the database path that sequences events under a lock.
What it came to
The auditor can state one thing: the stored bytes at sequence 1 no longer match the hash written for that row. Showing that nobody rewrote the whole chain takes a copy of the head held off the box, which this POC does not have.
The authority ladder. Green rungs are authoritative — a rule, a scanner, a sandbox, or a person. Blue is where the model contributes. Amber is where a human decides.
Nothing. Policy evaluation, sealing and the chain run no model. A detection from a model-backed tier can reach the evaluator as an input, and the evaluator itself does no inference.
It cannot claim directory identity, hardware custody or third-party anchoring. Someone with root on the appliance could reach the signing key, rewrite the chain and sign a new checkpoint. Only a copy of the head held off the box would expose that, and no external system holds one in this POC.
Real logic, in your browser, with no network requests.
Available for POC on seeded and synthetic inputs. Not shipping. M0 is committed v1 scope, and production still needs Active Directory and Kerberos sign-in, hardware officer tokens, a vendor SIEM as the off-box anchor, the HA pair, and the appliance image with signed update bundles.