Ciphertext in the database
Sealing means the evidence payload is ciphertext at rest, and opening it is a deliberate ceremony. Each event has its own data key. That key is wrapped by an evidence key, and officer shares wrap the evidence key in turn. The database holds the ciphertext. Plaintext evidence at rest is the failure the envelope is built to prevent.
The construction is AES-256-GCM, chosen so a reveal can decrypt in the browser with the platform’s own cryptography rather than a vendor service. Additional authenticated data binds the ciphertext to the event. Moving a ciphertext onto a different event is supposed to fail the check. The appliance does not export a decrypt function for that payload. Those are properties of the packages and of the verdict path’s sealed rows, and they are the part of sealing this POC actually implements.
The ceremony and the software key
A completed reveal has the shape a production ceremony would have: more than one officer, a check of enrolled key material, and a record of who unwrapped what. In this phase the keys are software keys the development profile can hold. The reveal surface names the token kind on each officer key so the stand-in stays visible. Hardware tokens are absent. A ceremony screen that hides the software label is presenting a stronger control than the one that ran.
Granting the officer role decrypts nothing by itself. Unwrap needs an enrolled key that holds a share, checked against the public key stored at enrolment. An administrator who can edit roles cannot read the officer-key list. Enrolment is keyed to the resolved officer, so enrolling one person twice does not let that person satisfy a threshold alone. The separation people notice on the account screen is not the separation the envelope uses.
What the chain covers after a drain
Decisions that have been drained are appended to a hash chain, and checkpoints over that chain are signed. Verification uses the stored canonical bytes. An acknowledgement advances the cadence only when its digest matches the checkpoint’s own stored bytes. Nothing on the appliance acknowledges its own checkpoints. In this phase the only acknowledger is a stand-in tool in place of a monitor’s return channel. Without that tool the cadence emits one checkpoint and stalls. The stall is the behaviour the design requires, and the evaluation should see it.
A checkpoint whose signing key is not in the registry counts as a failed check. A range that checked no checkpoint is a range that was not checked. An evaluation writes down whether an acknowledgement was supplied and whether the verifier matched the stored bytes. Those two notes are the chain result this phase can support.
The spool is not yet the chain
The local spool sits in front of the drain so a database outage does not turn an already-enforced verdict into an error for the caller. Captured content plaintext stays out of it. The only content-bearing field is the sealed output. The rest of the line is metadata in the clear: the actor, the machine, the destination, the matched rules, and the action.
Owner-only file modes are the control on that metadata. An undrained line has no signature and no link to the line before it. Write access to the spool directory during the window before a drain can change what later gets chained, and the checkpoint then covers the line as edited. The window is the drain cadence, and it grows for as long as the database cannot be reached. This phase leaves the spool without its own tamper-evident chain.
What an evaluation can show
Operators should be able to see who unwrapped which record, and that account of the reveal is part of sealing. This POC claims no production retention schedule for the account and no third-party anchoring of the checkpoints. An evaluation can show the envelope, the software-key label, the ceremony, and the chain as far as the stand-in acknowledgement allows.
How to read this
| Read it as | Which means | Do not read it as |
|---|---|---|
| Sealed | Ciphertext, unwrap is a deliberate step | A coloured label with nothing sealed behind it |
| This POC | Software officer keys | A hardware ceremony |
| Binding | Ciphertext swapped across events should fail | A reveal that skips the audit |