A service hop presents a machine certificate from the development CA
Services authenticate to one another with machine certificates. In this POC a development CA mints them, with a leaf for each service, and the caller presents its leaf on the hop. The listener refuses a connection that brings no certificate, a certificate from the wrong CA, or plaintext where the handshake is required. A leaf that chains to the right CA and still names the wrong service is refused as well, because the dial site pins the peer it expects.
The CA behind those checks is software. A hardware-bound machine identity is absent in this phase, including any TPM or other hardware root. The handshake is a real control against a casual attempt to impersonate a service on the path. It remains a software control, and the evaluation labels it as one. A documented way exists to start a listener without the material. An evaluation that uses that way is no longer looking at the handshake this section describes.
The actor in the header is resolved from the development roster
A request may carry an actor in a header. This POC resolves that name from the development roster. The resolution is independent of the machine certificate on the hop. The certificate, when it verifies under the software CA and the expected service name, establishes which service identity presented it. The header name is a second fact. The build does not weld the two together.
The product’s longer identity aim is a directory the estate operates. That integration is not what this POC authenticates. Binding the header’s person to the certificate is outside this phase. An evaluation can display the certificate and can display the header. Reporting them as one binding would report a control the build does not perform. The honest report has two lines.
Console sign-in checks a local password hash
A person at the console signs in to a local account. The check compares a password with a stored hash. The session records that a local password provider issued it, and the console can show that label. The hash is what stands between a reachable console and a session in this phase.
Directory single sign-on is a different product from the one running here. Active Directory remains the identity model the product aims at, and this login is not that integration. The factor is a single password. No second factor ships in this phase. There is also a development mode that can issue a session without checking the password, and it warns when selected. That mode must not be the one in use when a browser outside the box can reach the console, because in that mode the password field is decoration.
Roster names are evaluation fixtures
The development roster gives the hot path an actor to record so a demonstration has a name on the verdict. The names are there because the evaluation placed them there. They are not evidence that a directory, a badge process, or a hiring system confirmed the person. Quoting the name in a report without the roster label overstates what the header resolution did.
Attribution in the verdict inherits the same limit. The verdict can store the actor the header supplied, and that storage is enough for the demonstration to be inspectable. It does not show that the estate’s directory authenticated the person, and it does not show that the machine certificate belongs to them. Reports keep the roster label beside any actor they quote from this path.
Software service identity and software officer keys stay distinct
The machine CA and the officer keys are both software here, and they serve different duties. The CA authenticates a service hop. The officer keys are what a reveal uses to unwrap evidence, and hardware tokens for that custody are absent. Sharing the word software does not merge a hop authentication with an evidence unwrap. A hardware root for the machine is separately absent, which does not by itself describe the officer key.
The simulated endpoint fleet is a third stand-in sitting nearby. Inventory of endpoints in this phase is seeded, so a certificate presented on a service hop is not coverage, heartbeat, or tamper evidence for a live Windows host. Machine authentication on the hop can be genuine while the fleet drawn on screen is simulated. An evaluation that cares about both writes both, and it refuses a sentence that spends the hop to prove the fleet.
How to read this
| Read it as | Which means | Do not read it as |
|---|---|---|
| Service hop | Machine certificate from the dev CA | A hardware root of trust |
| Header actor | Resolved from the dev roster | Bound to that certificate |
| Sign-in | Local account and a password hash | Directory single sign-on |